The latest election to the Majles (parliament) saw those at the helm of Islamic Republic lean over the precipice and almost lose their balance. They were saved by the bell, or more accurately by the disarray and feebleness of their opponents. There was no doubt that the elections was on its way to becoming a referendum on the very existence of the Islamic state if only the opposition, both internal and outside had pushed their advantage. A unique opportunity was lost. What could have become the broadest and widest boycott, an open rejection of the regime of the Islamic Republic, and the opening of a chapter of social protest fizzled into an indecisive mess. A look at the sequence of events is instructive and illustrative.
The elections intensified a divide that had already formed in the ruling bloc, a divide symbolised by the deepening divisions between president Rafsanjani’s more pragmatic and pro-accommodation policies and the spiritual leader Ali Khameneii’s ultra-conservative stance. If in the economic field both clung for dear life to either side of the skirt hem of liberalisation, and in their different ways accepted the necessity of bowing to IMF structural adjustment policies, when it came to social policies they were pulling in two different directions.
Rafsanjani and the technocrats surrounding him worked for a policy of accommodation with the technocrats which meant some relaxation of the more extreme pressures on civil liberties and secular society. Their whole tenor was for a policy which would woo specialists inside and outside the country and remove Iran out of the international pariah status it so rightfully occupies. The general idea was to attract domestic and foreign investment by guaranteeing some social and political stability.
The Khameneii team, on the other hand has close links in the Bazaar and the most reactionary sections of the clergy. For them a release of the pressure cooker could only ultimately lead to the whole pot boiling over. The clergy would lose all prestige and power. While the above is a simplified resume of what is a much more complex situation it contains the core of the antagonism.
The result was a spiral of accusation and counter accusation. Rafsanjani appealed to the secular and technocratic sentiments while the Leadership launched the campaign against western “cultural assault” - anything from satellite dishes, to women donning designer sunglasses and men with T-shirts with “provocative” western logos, to closure of the numerous independent press now openly clamouring for a more open society.
Rafsanjani’s astute move was to encourage the formation of a semi-political party. Their cleverly chosen name - “Agents of Construction” (Kargozarane Sazandegi) - shows for whom their arrow is intended. While Rafsanjani was never publicly associated with the Agents everyone knew it was his “Party” - the technocrat’s party aimed at appealing to that section of the electorate wanting to break out of the stultifying social, economic, intellectual, and political atmosphere. It was also to be the party for all those who wanted to say no to all the above.
Yet despite the hype, both inside and outside the country, it is clear that Rafsanjani failed to achieve the grand coalition he aimed at, and indeed needed if he was to upset the imbalance in real power stacked up against him. The need for this broad coalition would become apparent if one considers how deeply the other side have infiltrated all the organs of real power: the Council of Guardians (which vets all Majles resolutions for Islamic correctness), the Interior Ministry, the Ministry on Information (security), the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards), the Association of Combatant Clergy and the chain of Friday Prayer Imams (who have an enviable platform in the public prayers each Friday), and not least the myriad grass root assault brigades of thugs1.
Rafsanjani hoped to attract the votes of all those who for one reason or another could not support the dominant faction in the political block - namely those identified with the spiritual leader Ali Khameneii, and the Majles speaker (and prospective presidential candidate) Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri. This would by all accounts have been an overwhelming coalition, though whether Rafsanjani would have been the main beneficiary is open to question. In any case the policy failed.
It failed in the first instance because of an unprecedented and virulent campaign against the Agents of Construction by among others: the outgoing Majles deputies, the Association of Combatant Clergy and the newspapers under their control2, the Council of Guardians (which was strategically placed by vetting the credentials of prospective parliamentary candidates), and not least Ali Khamenei’i himself.
Perhaps just as important was the vacillation, and indecision of the liberals inside the country3 who finally became paralysed. Having trumpeted the slogan of free elections inside and outside the country, they found themselves facing an opponent who was determined to aim for a uniform and uniformly favourable result from the elections. It became rapidly clear that the slogan of “free elections” would be an even a bigger farce on this occasion than in the last three elections. If the elections could not be remotely labelled “free” even in the limited definitions of the liberals4 then there was no point in beating that drum.
The radical wing of the liberals led by Dariush Foruhar changed tactics and took up the cry of the left for a boycott of the elections. This started an amazing snowball reaction. The slogan was echoed by a wide section of the opposition. The breadth of its initial appeal was staggering: This included the “Imam Line” left-wing of the regime symbolised by the radical paper Salam, the semi-tolerated opposition of Foruhar’s Party of the Iranian Nation, the secular National Front, the Republicans, and Fadaii Majority, the Kurdish democratic Party (Iran), through to the socialist left with such groups as the Organisation of Revolutionary Workers of Iran (Rahe Kargar), the Communist Party of Iran and the Worker-Communist Party of Iran.
This was an unprecedented coalition of
voices, and undoubtedly would have found an echo in a large number of people
who have no political affiliation, but were simply fed up and tired of the
massive economic hardships, the inflation, the petty repressions, the fact that
they had to do three or more jobs just to stay afloat - in short the four million or more wage earners who had
suffered most under the structural adjustment programmes and could not see a
way out, and their family.
This could have been a major referendum on the regime. Particularly as in the Islamic Republic, elections have a primary function of testing the water below. It is here that all factions obtain their legitimacy to act, and the whole regime obtains its legitimacy in the eyes of the faithful. Elections in the Islamic Republic are a form of beiat (allegiance) with the rulers, hence the hysterical exhortation to vote as a religious duty.
Yet within a few weeks the boycott had fractured. The reasons have more to do with the weakness of the opposition than the strength of the regime. The internal opposition, and in particular the radical “Salam” wing and the Mujahedin of Islamic Revolution5 was unable to act in unison and fractured. It is clear that they too could not remain immune from the constant internal crisis tearing the various factions of the regime apart. In the end they could not sustain their momentum in the face of the barrage of attacks by the supporters of Ali Khamenei’i and the ultra-right. The liberals too could not sustain the boycott. Virtually all the organs of propaganda was in the hands of the ultra-reactionary faction. They also had the Ansare Hezbollah who actively crushed any gathering no matter how mild. Several independent periodicals were closed and their editors arrested. Even the radical Imam line faction were not immune and their student paper Payame Daneshju was closed down. Such influential dissidents as Sorush who began openly questioning the right (and wisdom) of the clergy to rule had their lectures forcibly broken up and were even beaten up.
Under such pressures the opposition both internal and external could not lead a unified boycott. The left, physically weak, was unable to use its moral strength (which it undoubtedly had on the policy of an election boycott, having been the first to voice it) to weld this disparate coalition.
Meanwhile the regime did not only use repression. It resorted to the old ruse of introducing ration cards. At the time of extreme shortages (at least for those without the means of raiding the black market) this could make the difference of having meat or not on your table. The tell-tale stamp on the ID card said it all. Many were tempted others were scared into voting.
Despite some initial misconceptions it was obvious that the ultra-reactionary faction has the upper hand. Although the “Agents” apparently have a majority in the 5th Majles the faction supported by the Association of Combatant Clergy obtained a decisive majority in Teheran. It has been a feature of the Majles throughout its history that the powerful Teheran deputies call the tune6 . Furthermore, many of the provincial deputies may be nominally in the Rafsanjani camp but would go where the power is. This happened after the election to the previous Majles7 and would do so again.
Thus we now have a Majles where the ultra-conservative Khamenei’i-Nategh Nouri faction, which went for an all out domination, failed in its aims. The present Majles starts its life split almost down the middle.
There is however, a difference. The faction around Ali Khamenei’i has almost all the levers of power in its hands. It is natural to pursue these goals outside the Majles. If for Clautswitz war was politics by another means, then for those at the helm of the Islamic Republic, thuggery is elections by another means. Where they could, as in Isfahan, they annulled the election of the rival candidates. Where they couldn’t the battle has begun.
The dominant faction has already started with speeches by the Leader Ali Khamenei’i and the Pasdaran chief Mohsen Rezaii denouncing “liberals” (a transparent label for the pro-Rafsanjani faction). The Ansare Hezbollah are busy breaking up meetings. Papers continue to be closed down. Those mayors who helped pro-Rafsanjani candidates are being hauled in front of courts on various charges. Bahman a paper belonging to Rafsanjani’s close adviser, former UN representative Ata-allah Mohajerani, was banned. The streets are no longer safe for a few strands of hair showing beneath a scarf. Rafsanjani’s daughter’s attempts for women to cycle (fully clothed in a park) was shouted down as if the “testes of Islam” was being assaulted.
It all goes to make life for Rafsanjani and the reformers more difficult. Outside the Majles an atmosphere of permanent tension is being organised. It is under such a fiery air that preparations for the presidential elections are under way.
How long the country can bear this state of tension is difficult to guess. Withoubt doubt the indecisive nature of the Majles elections has not lessened the regime’s troubles. The Presidential elections could possibly complete what the failure of the Majles election boycott failed.
The opposition may try to learn from its indecision and weakness. The left must learn to act in concert and with decision. It is potentially possible to turn the presidential elections into a referendum for or against the ayatollahs in power. A successful boycott can be the first step in the overthrow of the regime. If only the various and differing oppositional forces, both within and without, can grasp the fact that the regime is not wanted.
This is no longer a wish-in-the-dark but a clear message for anyone with eyes to see, ears to listen and a nose to smell the decay. What is missing is a concerted platform of real and unadulterated democracy and a social force to carry it through. A fatal crack in the regime, which an effective boycott of the presidential elections will cause, can be the start of a long haul.
A Mehrdad, M Kia
August 1996
1 Such as the Ansare Hezbollah who broke up lectures by the now-dissident philosopher Sorush, or of cinemas showing “unsuitable” films.
2 Especially Keyhan, Resalat, Sobh, and Jumhuri Eslami
3 The Freedom Movement, Dariush Foruhar’s Party of the Iranian Nation, the National Front, the various republicans, social democrats and bits from the old Tudeh Party and Fadaii Majority etc.
4 Most had no difficulty of excluding the left or any one who did not entirely approve of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.
5 Dissolved at the instigation of Ayatollah Khomeini, but recently reconstituted as a political party
6 This was even true of the free elections to the Majles in pre-Revolutionary years such as the 14th-17th Majles led by the nationalist leader Dr Mossadegh in the 1950’s
7 Many Rafsanjani supporters defected to the other side when the Rafsanjani-Khamenei’i coalition broke up giving the latter almost complete control over the 4th Majles.