AM: Thank you
for the opportunity to discuss the national question in Iran. As there are so
many interpretations of this issue perhaps it might be best to start by asking
how you define a nation and how do you see its significance in Iran?
MH. I too thank you for the opportunity to discuss our understanding of
the national question from the viewpoint of out party. Form our perspective a
nation is defined by some general features: a single language, a single culture
and a single land. If we take these characteristics as a basis, and I believe
they are the right ones, we can see that in Iran, the Baluch, Azeri, Arab,
Turkeman, and Kurd are each a nation.
AM: Your
characteristics for a nation have on the whole an objective aspect. If all
these characteristics exist in a group of people, and yet they do not think of
themselves as a separate “nation” or do not wish to have a separate national
identity, can one still call them a nation? In short is a “nation” a natural
phenomenon or a historic one? Is its existence objective and real or subjective
and evolves from thought and imagination?
MH: once all these characteristics are found in a people then inevitably
they belong to a nation that makes up that group. This is an objective
existence. Like the Arabs living in south Iran, who may on occasions not see
themselves as Iranian but are ultimately Arab.
AM: Let us turn
to the “national question”. What do you consider the “national question” in
Iran to be? Is it the inequalities and discrimination between the various
nationalities and the fact that they do not have equal access to resources,
facilities and prospects? In other words everything that relates to a
non-democratic, and from the national point of view hierarchic, state structure
in a multinational country? Or alternatively, is the “national question” in
Iran in the final analysis the consequence of a unitary state in such a
multinational country. Or in other words the fact that different nation-states
did not arise in the physical space that is Iran today?
MH: The ugly consequences of an imposed and non-democratic rule of one
or more nationalities on the other nationalities living in the same country
constitutes in our view the “national question”. These governments think they
own the entire country and at best see the oppressed nations as second class
citizens. This translates as open discrimination in economics, government,
development, labour, equal distribution of wealth and such like.
AM: If we assume
that the “national question” or “national oppression” in Iran is the result of
system that is based on unequal relations between different nationalities, a
real understanding of this concept requires a deeper understanding of the
manifestations, and depth of this relationship. Can you expand on these
dimensions.
MJ: As part of the leadership of a Kurdish party that pursues the
national struggle along these paths, I will naturally concentrate on the
oppression of the Kurds. This should not be interpreted that the rights that we
talk about is confined to Kurds. I must emphasis that these rights should be
the right of all nationalities that make up greater Iran. All must be equal,
one of which are the Kurds.
Us Kurds have been oppressed during both the Pahlavi monarchy and the
Islamic Republic. We have been under economic oppression. For example the
budget allocation for Kurd-populated areas was always decided by centers headed
by non-Kurds and these individuals always made sure that the share of Kurdish
populated areas from the national budget were as small as possible. Please note
that large parts of Western Azerbaijan Province is populated by Kurds but the
decision makers in the provincial office have been non-Kurds who consistently
allocated the minimal budget for these areas. This issue has not only affected
the development of these regions but also in the creation of factories and
other places of work.
In comparison with Kurd-populated areas, cities on the outskirts of
Kurdistan such as Zanjan, Ghazvin and Tabriz and towns in the Eastern
Azerbaijan Province are full of large workshops, factories and industrial and
manufacturing centers. Yet you will not find a single factory in the entire
Kurd-populated areas – only tiny workshops – and even these have been erected
with local capital. The facts of economic discrimination are so blatant that it
strikes an outsider leaving Kurdish territories for other areas. A delegation
from the Socialist International who entered Iraqi Kurdistan via Iran wrote in
their report that when you enter the Kurd-populated areas from outside you are
struck by the obvious economic discrimination. This was their first visit to
the region.
The other issue is governmental discrimination ..
AM: Before
entering that area it might be worthwhile pausing on the economic
discrimination for a moment. You may wish to discuss, for example, the
allocation of money for enlarging the national road network. As far as I can
recall, road building in the Kurd-populated areas was greatly delayed. And when
the Pahlavi and Islamic regime embarked on this, it was mainly to answer
military needs. Is this correct?
MH:
This is true. Towards the end of the Pahlavi monarchy and at the start of the
Islamic Republic they built some roads near the border. These roads are
predominantly military and both regimes constructed them with this aim. From
the safety point of view these roads are incredibly precarious, but they will
do for troop movements should the need arise. Of course the people also use
these roads but compared to other parts of Iran the Kurdistan districts are
very week when it comes to road building. There is not a meter of railway in
the entire Iranian Kurdistan, not an insubstantial area, if we exclude the
railway line crossing the Bazargan border into Turkey.
AM: As far as I
recall, at least in the last dozen years, there has been substantial central
budget allocation for sewage and water systems and also piped natural gas to
many provinces. Some provinces, such as Qom were even prioritized. How did
Kurdistan fare
?
MH:
The sewage system in Kurdistan is rudimentary, and built at maximum cost, which
the clients paid. In most towns in Kurdistan gas pipelines are still in their
rudimentary phases, and even where piping has started it remains incomplete.
From the information we have received it appears that many of these pose
security risks, since necessary care has not been taken when laying down the
pipes. On many occasions these have exposed the population to danger. Thus the
people cannot benefit in the same way from a blessing that actually belongs to
the entire population. Kurdistan, being mountainous, is often covered by heavy
snow blocking road access and preventing fuel shipment. Thus gas is even more
vital here than in other areas.
AM: one of the
issues highlighted by the 1979 revolution was housing. Notwithstanding the ways
people found to circumvent this problem, under intense pressure from below the
post-revolutionary regime was also forced to make some efforts over this. Can
you tell me what was the share of Kurdistan of the many projects the overblown
Ministry of Housing has proposed,? Did any of the loudly trumpeted schemes of
recent years – such as loans for cheap housing or what are called “social
housing” undertaken in Kurd-peopled regions? And if so do they have any
relation to the housing needs of the people? Essentially what are the
per-capita expenditure from the general budget for housing in the region and
how does it compare to other parts of the country?
MH:
All the brouhaha over housing and according to you housing loans, in Kurdistan
culminated in some feeble efforts to build a few official housing estates in
some university towns and for university professors. And even that not much.
The regime’s cronies were able to exploit these facilities to build houses at
minimal cost and sell or rent them at huge profit. Since the people of
Kurdistan are economically weak, the cost of housing, whether in mortgage
payments or rental swallows up a sizeable portion of their income. Consequently
housing has become a major issue for the people.
Not
surprisingly, most people live in housing which from the safety and health
aspect is poor. A storm or heavy snowfall is enough for it to collapse on their
heads. Even recently constructed housing, since the builders – mostly linked to
the regime – are not accountable for any shortcomings and do not face any
penalties, collapse after a while. People who after endless misery have managed
to pay off a mortgage, or pay the rent, not only face physical danger when it
collapses, but have to cope with the additional financial misery. And there is
no one to answer to this. Thus even if they had actually allocated a decent
budget for housing in Kurdistan, poor people, peasants and workers, those with
low income would not have benefited.
AM: What about
medical care? That was always a problem in the Kurdish districts. What about
now. How does the health allocations compare with the national average?
Look!
The issues of treatment is a huge problem across the country. The number of
hospital beds are so short of actual needs everywhere that few patients can
find a bed in time and get treatment. That is why people flock to the private
sector despite their meager income. These private hospitals are also means in
the hands of a few capitalists to milk the people in any way they like. Since
health and treatment are not issues that people can ignore, they will lave to
find whatever money is required come what may.
Even
though the cost of treatment is high throughout Iran, it is even higher in
Kurdistan. The reason for this is the greater paucity of hospital beds there.
If in Tehran there is one hospital bed per thousand population, in Kurdistan
this ratio is 1:5,000- 10,000. most Kurdish sick have to travel to other parts
for treatment and this incurs greater costs. The other issue, which you may be
aware of, is the poor quality of some of the medicines manufactured in Iran – reflecting
the corruption that has permeated the regime. This has caused a lot of problems
for patients. It was only after some newspapers reported some very bad
reactions people had to them, only after this scandal that the regime decided
to ban them. In a country where the rule of law operates, where the health of
the population is taken seriously, they would not let drugs out into the market
without test, standardization and safeguards. Sadly there is no trace of these
in Iran and in these respects Kurdistan fares worse. Not surprisingly some
resort to traditional healers which had no scientific basis, or even to shamans
and soothsayers.
AM: Can we also
compare Iranian Kurdistan with Iraqi Kurdistan which has been a scene of
warfare for the last few years. It has been unstable, under intense pressure
from the central government, and had other constraints. With all these problems
are conditions for health, housing and municipal services worse than in Iranian
Kurdistan?
MH:
I can say with full knowledge that this is not so. They fare, indeed, better.
In the last decade Iraqi Kurdistan has been burning under a ruinous civil war
which has caused untold damage both to life and property. But since this civil
war ended four years ago building and healthcare services have blossomed
everywhere. The budget for this is a mere 13% of the UN sponsored the
oil-for-food program. Yet this is so large that the local Kurdish government
does not have the means to absorb it fully. Although tens of development
projects, such as sewage, street widening and asphalt, building, piped clean
water to villages, and electrification on a wide scale have been, and continue
to be, executed, the entire budget has not been absorbed.
Wherever
you go you can clearly see clear signs of development. Every journalist that
has visited the region has been struck by the changes that have taken place
over the last 5 years. Medicines are mostly available free to patients and only
a few are sold in pharmacies and mostly for those visiting private doctors.
Anyone going to the hospitals get their treatment and medicines free and most
people are taking advantage of this. Indeed a number of Iranian Kurds living on
the border cross over to attend these hospitals. The Kurdish doctors are hard
working, care for their patients and work with much energy . The hospitals are
in good shape. I believe that if the regions experiences a period of stability
they will work even harder.
Compare
this with the Islamic Republic which has been getting over 20 years of oil-income
in a country which is endowed with good land and because of poor management has
fallen on these hard times. One can only feel sad. It is tragic that with such
facilities and such wealth a country can be squandered, with its people
becoming daily poorer, with less income and greater frustration.
AM: My last
question on social issues is over education. Can we leave aside for the moment
the issue of language which is a subject in itself, I would like to concentrate
on two aspects. One is the way education is being offered and the inequalities
that can occur in its distribution in Kurd-populated areas of Iran. Secondly,
the national curriculum and how it takes into account the social and cultural
peculiarities of Kurdistan?
MH:
I have to say that the situation of education and the educative environment is
dreadful across the country. It is even more dire in Kurdistan. The first issue
is that parents are asked to pay under a whole range of guises. Although the
regime insists that primary and secondary education is free, in practice the
money asked is so large that it is beyond the means of the majority. Because of
this many families only send two or three of their 4-5 kids to school.
The
next issue is the actual tutoring. As you know the culture, language, and
religion of the majority of Kurds is different than the other Iranian
nationalities. Yet most of the teachers sent into Kurdistan are foreign to all
of these. Most of the discussion that take place in class ends up in
denigrating the people and the pupils. When the majority of Kurds with higher
education are unemployed, most secondary school and university lecturers are
from outside the territory. This is a clear humiliation and also has a negative
impact in education.
Education
experts who value education as a national investment emphasize the importance
of the teacher-pupil relationship. In Kurdistan these values have been tuned on
their head. Teachers have been brought in because they are hezbollah
(fundamentalist), believe in the Islamic Republic, or belongs to the family of
a martyr with some or other university degree. This increases the contradiction
and conflict between the people of Kurdistan and other areas. Right form the
start it causes a resentment in the pupil against their teacher. The teacher
aught to be loved by the pupil from every angle. The pupil ought to see him or
her as a kind parent or a sincere friend. This ralationship does not exist
between pupil and teacher or professor in Kurdistan since the duties give to
teachers imported from other areas is something different.
Their
role is to brain wash the students to be, for the Islamic Republic in the
future, meek, obedient and as they put it polite and Islamic. Clearly this
strategy will fail, just as it did in Tehran and other areas. It will
definitely have an even greater opposite effect in Kurdistan. When there isn’t
a relationship of sincerity and trust between student and professor undoubtedly
education will not have the desired result.
This
is why there are a large number of students in Kurdistan who abandon their
education at various stages. They cannot continue both because of financial
reasons and because they hate school and do not trust their teachers. Instead
of being a place of fun, and healthy environment for learning and education,
school and university is a place where they find themselves being humiliated,
pressured and oppressed. A place where the student cannot express their views,
yet there are non-native teachers that continuously try to indoctrinate things
to them which are not only boring but hateful. When a student feels that their
nationality, language, religion and even clothes are ridiculed and they cannot
talk to their teacher as they want then clearly they will become resentful. In
Iran, sadly, little attention is paid to a healthy relationship between pupil
and teacher, especially in Kurd-populated areas which have always been regarded
by suspicion by the Islamic Republic.
Even
if in say, the city of Qom, they might initially warn or question a student who
might have said something negative about the Islamic Republic or one of its
leaders, such a thing in Kurdistan would cause pandemonium. They would have to
go back and forth for dozens of days or even months to find out from where, and
which “counter-revolutionary” source they may have been “indoctrinated”. There
are many examples of this.
When
the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party – Turkey) leader Abdullah Ocalan was abducted,
the people of Iranian Kurdistan, from national sensitivity to this terrorist
act, took to the streets to demonstrate. And of course during these
demonstrations they brought up their own grievances. The way these
demonstrations were dealt with has absolutely no relation to the way people
taking part in demonstrations in Tehran, Shiraz or Isfahan have been treated
these last few years. About 50 persons were killed, hundreds were injured and
over 1,000 arrested and imprisoned. We never saw such savage repression in
other demonstrations. Because whatever happens in Kurdistan the Islamic
Republic thinks that it is coming from outside. The Kurdish people are not
regarded as fellow compatriot. They are not like other compatriots. Everything
about them is different from others. The way the regime sees them and deals
with them is different. This creates a very destructive attitude towards the
Islamic Republic among students.
We
see the results that despite all the regime’s efforts to bring the youth to the
so-called righteous path, and to mold them into obedient and docile persons
faithful to the regime, they have failed abysmally. They may not admit this
publicly, but they do so privately among themselves. The Islamic Republic knows
that if elections were to be held in a free atmosphere, then the Kurdistan
democratic party of Iran will win at all stages. It is sad that despite all
these negative experiences and defeats in their educational program, the regime
persist with this backward and inhuman system.
Part
2 of this interview will be published in the next issue. The interview first
appeared in Rahe Kargar number 169, in Farsi, in Winter-Spring 2001-2.