The origin and development of imperialist contention in Iran; 1884-1921: part II

A case study in under development and dependency

Younes Parsa Benab

After the Anglo-Russian invasion of Iran and brutal suppression of the heroic uprising in Tabriz, [51] Iran fell under the increased control of Britain and Russia [52]. While striving to perpetuate their domination of Iran, the Russians and the British reiterated their pledge of respecting the "integrity" and "independence" of Iran according to the 1907 Convention. After the outbreak of World War I, the Russian troops were in actual control of the northern provinces, and the British South Persia, Rifles, organised and led by Sir Percy Sikes, occupied the southern provinces of Isfahan and Shiraz [53]. In retrospect, it is a fact that Britain and Russia were slowly preparing to substitute annexations for the spheres of influence [54]. The outbreak of war put an end to such imperial intentions, and the Russian and British armies made a battleground of Iran's out-lying regions against Turkish and German forces at one time or another throughout the War years [55].

The years between the outbreak of the World War and the Bolshevik (October) Revolution were characterised by the formation and development of armed struggle by democratic forces in Iran against foreign domination and the outright imperialist attempts to colonise Iran. Although the nominal government in Tehran declared its neutrality, Tzarist troops occupied Azerbaijan, which borders Turkey, and Iran became a Russo-Turkish battleground. Imperial Germany, a new rising imperialist power, tried to woo Iranian nationalists to her side and she naturally had the propaganda advantage [56]. The liberal nationalist leadership, loosely organised in the Democratic Party in Iran, accepted German support in order to combat the Anglo-Russian occupation. The concerted and nearly successful conspiracies of the German and the Turks in penetrating the national liberation movements of the Iranian against the Anglo-Russian machination, gave these two latter imperialist powers enough of a pretext to join hands and establish a liaison between their respective occupied areas in Iran. Both powers even secretly agreed (March, 1915) that Great Britain, in exchange for the neutral zone in Iran would recognise Tzarist interests in Constantinople and Russia's right to a free hand in northern Iran, and both powers then would control Iran through a puppet government in Tehran [57]. The occupation of Iran and the close collaboration between the two competing powers remained unchanged for the next two years until October, 1917 [58], when the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia radically transformed the situation, on the one hand, in favour of the national liberation movement and, on the other, against British interests in Iran.

After the Bolshevik Revolution, Soviet Russia pursued a qualitatively different foreign policy strategy in Iran. Immediately after the seizure of power, the Bolsheviks manifested their policy toward Iran by renouncing all the extraterritorial rights and privileges that Tzarist Russia had forcibly acquired and called upon the people of Iran to unite in order to liberate themselves from "the yoke of British imperialism" and her native allies [59].

The fundamental goal of the Soviets in their anti-imperialist policy toward Iran was to weaken and /or neutralise the British military presence in Iran: a presence which was constantly threatening the security the young Soviet Republic [60].

The British occupation of Iran during the First World War, so long it was aimed at main-tainting the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 and at preventing Iran from being drawn into "the orbit of German diplomacy," gave rise to no difficulties with Russia [61]. But after the Bolshevik Revolution a dramatic change of relationship between Russia and Britain took place. No longer did the British and the Russia's act in concert and collusion, but, instead, the two diametrically-opposed systems waged a life- and death struggle in Iran. The Bolshevik seizure of power created a far reaching transformation in the character of "power politics." The expansionist policies of Tzarist Russia, which had long been in unison with the British, were now replaced by the anti-imperialist and revolutionary policies of the Bolsheviks, especially in regard to the total Russian troop withdrawals from Iran [62].

The Bolshevik decision to withdraw the Russian troops from Iran in favour of supporting the national liberation forces created a vacuum in Iran which the British attempted to fill. The dynamic impact of the Bolshevik Revolution on the Iranian liberation movement and the discovery and exploitation of huge reservoirs of petroleum in Iran made the British move in the direction of colonising Iran [63].

Throughout the period from 1918 to 1920, the British permitted officers of Denikin and other white Russian generals to use Iran as a base from which to wage their wars against Lenin's Russia [64]. Apart from supplies furnished to the anti-Bolshevik Russians, the British troops, under the leadership of Dunsterville, moved north through Iran and, with the aid of Russian white Guards occupied the valuable oil provinces of the Caucasus. These military aggressions by the British forces could hardly fail to attract attention in Moscow [65].

To Lenin and his associates, the fundamental strategic goal in Iran was to see that the British would fail in their attempt to use Iran as a spring board to attack the Soviet Republic. But, apart from this important security principle, the Bolsheviks attached importance to the increasing strategic role of Iran in relation to the outcome of the national liberation movements in the East. In fact, the theoretical concept of the Bolsheviks in regard to the "semi-colonial" condition of Iran as well as other Asian countries originated much earlier than the time of the Bolshevik take-over in Russia. As early as 1908, Lenin, noting a new significance in the revolutionary movement in Iran, Turkey, and India, pointed out:

There shall be no doubt that the age-old British system of plunder in India, and the present struggle of these "progressive" Europeans against Persian....Democracy, will steel millions of proletarians throughout Asia, for a struggle against oppressors [66].

The impact of the First World War on the Asians and the upsurge of national self-determination movements [67] prompted an earnest revaluation of the strategic guidelines of the Marxist theory and practice of revolution. More then Rosa Luxembourg's and Bukharin's analysis of imperialism, [68] Lenin's work, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, [69] left the greatest impact on Marxism and the destiny of the liberation movement in the East. In elaborating his theoretical concept of imperialism, Lenin in July, 1916, expressed the view that:

National wars waged by colonies and semi-colonies in the imperialist era are not only probable but inevitable. About 1,000 million people, or over half of the World's population, live in the colonies and semi-colonies (China, Turkey, Persia). The national liberation movement there are either already strong or are growing and maturing. Every War is the continuation of politics by other means. The continuation of national liberation politics in the colonies will inevitably take the form of national wars against imperialism [70].

Stressing the significance of cutting off and separating the European capitalist powers from the raw materials and markets of the colonial and semi-colonial counties in the underdeveloped countries, Lenin further commented in 1916:

Socialists must not only demand the unconditional and immediate liberation of the colonies without recompensation - and this demand in its political ramification signifies nothing more or less than the recognition of the right to self-determination - but, they must render determined support to the more revolutionary elements in the bourgeois democratic movements for national liberation in these countries and assist them in rebellion, and if need be, in their revolutionary war against the imperialist powers that oppress them [71].

After the Bolshevik seizure of power, the colonial and "semi-colonial" problem achieved a qualitative significance which no serious Bolshevik could ignore. Seeking to apply the Marxist theory of revolution to the contemporary world, the Bolsheviks were confronted with the task of setting up guidelines and strategies not only for the capitalist countries, but also for the technologically backward Eastern countries [72].

On the theoretical level two problems in regard to the revolution in the East had to be solved: (1) the question of nationalism in the "backward" countries where European rule or pervasive influence was the order of the day and nationalist upsurges, of varying strength, which were attempting to abolish European domination; and (2) the question of the social and economic conditions of the Eastern countries where the capitalist phase of development had either not started or was not completed.

In relation to nationalism, Lenin and his Asian associates, such as M.N. Roy of India and A. Sultanzadeh of Iran, developed contrasting analyses of the problem in their respective theses presented in the Second Congress of the Communist International [73]. Lenin recommended to the Asia communist parties a temporary alliance with the national and anti-colonial movements, providing that:

…the elements of the future proletarian parties, which will be communist not only in name, are brought together and trained to appreciate their special tasks, that is, to fight the bourgeois-democratic movements within their own nations [74].

Roy, a distinguished Indian Marxist, on the other hand, believed that socialism had to oppose bourgeois nationalism and proposed no compromise with the latter in the underdeveloped counties [75].

Influenced by Lenin but concerned over the particular characteristics of his own country, Sultanzadeh, a noted Iranian communist, contended that:

The passage in the thesis (of Lenin) in which support is pledged for the bourgeois-democratic movement in the backward countries, appears to me to be applicable only to these countries where the movement is still in an embryonic stage, but not in those countries where the movement has already been going on for ten years and more, or in those countries where, as in Persia, the bourgeois democracy is the basis and the prop of the government. In Persia such a support would mean leading the masses to counter-revolution. In such countries, we must create a purely communist movement in opposition to the bourgeois tendencies. Any other attitude might bring deplorable results [76].

Finally, Lenin's guideline, which emerged with a number of modifications, [77] was approved by the Second Congress of the Communist International and henceforth became the basis of Soviet theory and practice on the national and colonial questions.

Concerning the second question, whether or not the capitalist stage could be skipped, the Bolsheviks sought necessary modifications. Stalin for example, maintained that it was possible for a non-capitalist country to by-pass the capitalist phase of its historical development if its national-democratic revolution was led by the communist party of that country. A transition period would be required during which great caution would have to be exercised. The party's tactics, he contended, must be flexible, taking into account all the peculiarities of economic life and even the history, social life, and culture of these nations [78].

At the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920, Lenin laid down the theoretical formulation of such a policy by declaring that, with the assistance of the class-conscious "proletariat of the advanced countries," the oppressed peoples of the East could certainly push forward to establish Soviet Republics [79]. He contended that once the first proletarian state had been consolidated in Soviet Russia, the peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies could liberate them selves from imperialist domination, provided they were helped by the advanced proletariat. They could then by pass the capitalist stage of development and move directly from the feudal or semi-feudal stage to socialism [80].

Having outlined the political guidelines and directives for national liberation movement in the East, the Bolsheviks launched campaigns to spread the revolutionary views to the East, especially to the "semi-colonies" of Turkey, Iran and China.

III

Of the colonies and "semi-colonies" in Asia, Iran was certainly viewed as the most fertile ground for the application of these policies. In fact, after the Bolshevik Revolution, the strategic significance of Iran in the eyes of Lenin and his associates substantially increased. While to the Tzars the territorial conquest of Iran was considered a step toward gaining access to India, to the early Bolsheviks Iran appeared as a favourable land for breeding an anti-imperialist struggle which, with the support of the Bolsheviks, could be utilised as a spark for the socialist revolution in Asia. The Bolsheviks were of the opinion that a successful revolution in Iran would be a significant step toward revolution in India because Iran was a gateway to the Indian sub-continent [81].

In fact, these theoretical policies had found their application in a written appeal (“To All Muslim toilers of Russia and the East”), issued on November 24/December 7, 1917 by the Council of people's Commissars. The Muslims of Russia were assured that their beliefs and traditions, “their national and cultural institutions”, were hence forth protected. Those of the East - among whom Iranian were specifically named -were encouraged to overthrow the imperialist “robbers and enslavers” of their countries. Furthermore, the appeal declared that “the treaty for the partition of Persia is null and void. Immediately after the cessation of military operations, the troops will be withdrawn from Iran and the Iranians will be guaranteed the right freely to determine their own destiny” [82].

Of no less political significance was the invitiation dispatched by the Third International to the peoples of the East for them to convene in Baku for solidarity purposes on August 15, 1920. An important and relevant section of the invitation declared:

Peasants and Workers of Persia! The Tehran Qajar Government and its hirelings - the provincial Khans - have plundered and exploited you for centuries. The land was seized by the Lackeys of the Tehran government; they control this land, they are imposing taxes and levies on you at their discretion; and after having drained the country of its vitality and reduced it to poverty and ruin, they sold Persia last year to the English Capitalists for 2,000,000 sterling, so that the latter could form an army in Persia which will oppress you even more than heretofore [83].

By declaring that the Anglo-Russia convention of 1907 over the division of Iran was null and void and by inviting the representation of these nations to Baku, the Bolsheviks were trying to gain popular support for their policies in Iran. The favourable reaction of the Iranian to ward the Bolshevik renunciations was remarkable [82]. For example, Iran, a prominent daily newspaper in Tehran, quickly pointed out that:

The Russia Revolution and the Lenin Manifesto (the appeal by Council of People's Commissar ) took away the dangers of Russia, and now, the only differences that remain are between Persia and England. . . Since receiving the manifesto of Lenin, regarding the nullification of the 1907 convention by the Russian Government, we have hope and expected that England also would notify us that the said treaty is null and void [83].

Kaveh, a noted political magazine, reacted in the same way by praising the sincerity of the Bolsheviks in relation to Iran's independence and progress. It denounced the British for their ambiguous statements concerning the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 [84].

Appreciating the favourable impact of their renunciation policy upon the press and public opinion in Iran, the Bolsheviks moved forward to achieve their major policy objective in Persia: to prevent Great Britain from using Iran as a base for an attack on Soviet Russia.

For the fulfilment of this basic strategic aim, the Soviet leaders opted to: (1) assist the Communist Party of Iran through the Comintern offices; [85] (2) withdraw Russian troops from Iran and renounce all Tzarist concessions and treaties [86]; and (3) initiate an offensive diplomacy in Tehran, coupled with the full support for the national liberation movements in Ghilan, Azerbaijan, and Khorasan [87].

In struggling to implement their anti-imperialist policies in Iran, the Bolsheviks challenged the British interests and, thus, brought about a conflict with Britain. The nature this conflict was fundamentally different from the traditional rivalry between Tzarist Russia and Great Britain. To the government of Palmerstone and Curzon, Tzarist Russia, either as an open or a secret rival, was an empire with which they were accustomed to colluding and/or colliding, because both empires had similar socio-political and foreign policy outlooks. Furthermore, Tzarist Russia was an imperialist power which could be understood in the context of the international status quo and the law of imperialist contention. Certainly, the Russia of the Tzarists was a rival which the British - either liberal or conservative - could communicate, exchange diplomatic niceties, and even reach an “entente” with to divide Iran into “spheres of influence”. But the Bolsheviks were qualitatively different types of “enemies”. Their renunciations of all significant concessions obtained throughout the centuries of Tzarist military and political expansion in Iran were completely incomprehensible to the empire-oriented British statesmen. They could not understand the Bolsheviks' support of the national liberation movement in Iran and elsewhere. In addition, the British now could not persuade the Bolsheviks to come to an understanding over Iran and the Middle East.

Therefore, after the Bolshevik Revolution, the conflict between the new Russia and Great Britain became even more antagonistic. Lenin and his associates struggled, on the one hand, to combat the British imperialist presence and on the other, to assist the national liberation movements in Iran.

Facing the rise of the anti-imperialist tide in Iran, the British originated and planned the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919. Curzon's plan was to create a chain of pro-British countries stretching from the Mediterranean to the borders of India aimed at perpetuating Great Britain's interest in the strategically-located Iran [88]. “The weakest and most vital link” of the Chain, as viewed by Curzon, was Iran. On these grounds, he regarded a policy of evacuation of Iran by the British as “immoral, feeble and disastrous” [89]. To avoid such a "disaster", (i.e., the victory of the national liberation movement and the expulsion of the British troops from Iran), Great Britain sought to dominate Iran by imposing the infamous Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919.

The Anglo-Persian Agreement of August 9, 1919 contained a preamble and six Articles. In Article I, Britain reiterated the policies which she had repeatedly pretended to follow in the past regarding the “independence and integrity” of Persia. The remaining Articles provided that Britain would (1) supply, at Iran's expense, advisers for the Iranians administration; (2) equip, at the expense of Iran, the reorganisation of the Iranian army; (3) furnish a substantial loan of 200,000 pounds to Iran to be repaid by the Iranian administration at the rate of seven percent per annum; (4) co-operate with the Iranian government to improve the system of communication; and (5) sponsor the appointment of a committee of experts to study a revision of existing tariff regulations [90].

Curzon who saw in the agreement the climatic achievement of his career and regarded it as a “diplomatic masterpiece”, [91] justified the signature of this treaty to the British Cabinet in the following analysis:

If it be asked why we should undertake the task at all, and why Persia should not be left to herself and allowed to rot into picturesque decay, the answer is that her geographical position, the magnitude of our interests in the country, and the future safety of our Eastern Europe render impossible for us now - just as it would have been impossible for us any time during the last fifty years - to disinherit ourselves from what happens in Persia. Moreover, now that we are about to assume the mandate for Mesopotamia, which will make us coterminous with the western frontiers of Asia, we cannot permit the existence between the frontiers of our Indian Empire and Baluchistan and those of our new protectorate, of a hotbed of misrule, enemy intrigue, financial chaos and political disorder. Further, if Persia were to be alone, there is every reason to fear that she would be overrun by Bolshevik influence from the north. Lastly, we possess in the south-western corner of Persia great assets in the shape of oil fields, which are worked for the British navy and which give us a commanding interest in that part of the world [92].

Presenting the conclusion of the treaty as necessary step to preserve the vital interest of the British in the East, Curzon further elaborated:

If that end (protecting the British interests in the Middle East from Bolshevik encroachment ) was a right and reasonable end, it was necessary and vital that Great Britain and Persia work together in order to secure it. Great Britain and Persia were jointly prepared to defend that Agreement, and they looked forward to the vindication of its real character by its success [93].

In Iran, opposition to this capitulatory treaty with England was both organised militant. The most significant factor in the ever-increasing hostilities toward this treaty was the upsurge of Iranian nationalism in its new and anti-imperialist scope. This new phenomenon reflected the growing antagonism toward Great Britain and the subservience of the Iranian ruling elites who served British interests.

Seeing the ever-growing hostility of the people against this treaty, Britain shifted from the traditional strategy of maintaining her interest in Iran to outright intervention by planning and engineering a military coup d'etat which succeeded in toppling Iran's weak but constitutional, government in February, 1921, and brought about twenty years of terror and military rule under Reza Khan's dictatorship.

In retrospect, the dynamics of the anti-imperialist policies of Bolshevik Russia and the British plan to maintain her economic interest in Iran by quelling the national liberation movement had a series of far-reaching consequences on Iran's social-political institutions and ideological foundation as a Third World country after 1919.

The Bolshevik Revolution and the obvious change in the nature and scope of Anglo-Russian relations polarised the politically active forces in Iran into three major streams: pro-British conservatives, (the traditional ruling elites), pro-Soviet leftist groups, and democratic-constitutionals (nationalist) factions.

The pro-British forces, led by Vusuq al-Dowleh advocated that Iran's “salvation” from territorial disintegration and “national disunity” rely on the active support of the British “containment” policy against the spread of Bolshevism toward the south, in the direction of the Persian Gulf. Frightened by the Bolshevik Revolution and the rise of national liberation movements in Gilan and Azerbaijan, the ruling elites saw fit to make an “alliance” with British power by negotiating the infamous Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919. Our investigation of this decision by ruling elites shows definitively that its consequences gave rise to the development of a genuine anti-imperialist struggle throughout Iran. One serious result, as far as her public image was concerned, was that Great Britain became associated with a small group of men generally regarded as traitors to the nation.

Two factors shaped the basis for this judgement. One was the concept of nationalism by articulated Iranians. For them, it embodied, as it does now, loyalty to constitutionalism (i.e. free and honest elections), land distribution, and a tendency toward an active neutralism, or a Third World position, in the international relations of Iran [94]. Vusuq al-Dowleh's regime betrayed the first, opposed the second, and undermined the third,

The second factor which played a decisive role in the widening of the gap between the ruling elite and the masses was the attitude of the Iranians toward major foreign powers, which was directly connected with their support of, or opposition to, the established Iranian regime. The closer the identification of the government with the foreign power, the more hostile and pronounced was the attitude of the Iranians toward that power [95].

In actuality, the dependence of the conservative forces on Britain allowed the latter to use Iranian territory as a springboard for assisting anti-Bolshevik Russians to fight against the Soviets. The object of this incursion was to combat Bolshevik expansion in Asia and to protect British interests in India and Central Asia, which both bordered on Iran.

The nationalists, or democratic-constitutional forces, opposed the regime's capitulation and viewed the agreement as a wicked instrument to shackle the Iranians. The nationalist program, in contradistinction to Vusuq's reliance on Britain, advocated an active nationalist and anti-British stand in the Middle East. The nationalist cause was advanced by parliamentary constitutionalists, such as Mostofi al-Mamalek, in Tehran and was enhanced by revolutionary constitutionalists, such as Kuchek Khan and Khiabani, in the provinces [96]. The latter faction took the law into its own hands in the provinces and called on Iranian peasants in Gilan and urban masses in Tabriz to rise against a small group of men - i.e., Vusuq al-Dowleh, Princes Massoud and Firuz, etc., - who had captured the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, had ousted the democrats, and had become the “gate-keepers” of British imperialism in Iran [97]. Within a year after the signing of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919, Gilani peasants, Azari revolutionaries, religious progressives, and democratic constitutionalists were fighting a war of national liberation against the British power and their collaborators in Tehran [98].

The Iranian national liberation movement somewhat shook portions of Iranian society, but consequently failed in achieving its desired end when supporters of an “ultra left” wing within the Iranian communist party (CPP) split with the Kuchek Khan - Haidar Amougli united front and launched anti-religious and anarchist campaign in the Iranian villages of Gilan [99].

Underestimating the strength of Iranian nationalism, this wing lacked any confidence in the ability of the rebels in Gilan, Azerbaijan, and Khorasan to maintain their independent positions against the foreign powers. To be sure, the policy and strategy of this wing within the CPP and the structural weakness of the democratic forces were important factors in causing the gradual decline of Iranian constitutionals and the rise of Reza Khan's dictatorship in Iran.

By 1921, the response of the politically active forces to the epoch-making Bolshevik Revolution and British attempts to perpetuate her interest in Iran intertwined with Iran's historical specificity, brought about several social, economic, political, and ideological changes. This set the stage for the gradual weakening and ultimate fall of Iran's constitutional democracy and the emergence of Reza Khan's military dictatorship. First the Persian political community assumed its established role as a buffer state, and the domestic economy became dependent on Britain. Second, the ruling elements became discredited and proved to be incapable of fulfilling their integrating role in the political community.

Third, the rise of national consciousness, the dispersion of central authority, and the continued interference by Britain gave rise to national liberation movements in Gilan and Azerbaijan. Fourth, the political weaknesses of these liberation forces, chronic factionalism among the democratic forces in the Majlis, as well as the mounting intervention and political manipulation by Britain, and the intrigues of the ruling elements brought about the defeat of the national liberation movement.

Finally, the failure of these major socio-political forces (liberation movements and the Majlis) in consolidating political power and establishing order in Iran resulted in political decay and set the stage for the seizure of political power by army and the rise of Reza Shah to power.

To be concluded in next issue

Parsa Benab

This is part 2 of a three-part series. Part 2 appeared in iran bulletin nos 21-22 and Part 3 will appear in the next issue.

Younes Parsa Benab is Associate Professor of Economics at Strayer College, Washington DC. Since 1986 he has been Academic Dean. He is co-founder and editor of Review of Iranian Political Economy and History. His publications include Political Organisations in Iran (1979), Tabriz in Perspective: a historical analysis of the current struggles of the Iranian people (1977), Oil embargo: analysis (1973)

Footnotes

51. Great Britain, State Papers 1912, Persia No. 3. London: H.M.S.O. ,1913, pp. 105, 120 and 129.

52. The suppression of the nationalist uprising by Russians was followed by a wholesale massacre of the constitutionalists in Tabriz. Sigat al-Islam, one of the most respected religious pontiffs in Iran, was arrested and ordered to sign a declamatory document that Russian suppression of the constitutionalists was for “stability” and “normalisation” purposes. The pontiff refused to obey and was therefore flogged and finally hanged in the public market square on the most respected and observed religious day in the Iranian calendar, Ashura. This specific Russian savagery aroused anger all over the world among Muslims against the Tzars. For reference, see Iran September 7, 1917 Chehrenoma March 4, 1912; and E.G. Browne, The Reign Of Terror at Tabriz. London: Taylor, Garnett, Evans and Co. 1912, pp.1-15.

53. Yahya. Dowlatabadi, Tarikh-i Moaser, Ya Hayat-i Yahya (A contemporary History, or the Life of Yahya), 4 Vols.Teheran: Ibn Sina, 1326-1332/ 1947-1953. Vol. IV, p.26.

54. Ibid, pp.26 ff.

55. Chehrenoma, March 27, 1917; Hable al-Matin August 17, 1914; and Bahar, A Brief History p. 120.

56. Habl al-Matin, December 28, 1914, January 4, February 1, 1915; also, Iran, September 7, 1917; and Chehrenoma, February 14, 1915.

57. For reference, see Habl al Matin, June 4, July 19, 1914, and February 15, 1915; also consult, Kaveh Vol. III, No. 28 (May 15,1918) p. 5.

58. See Iran, January 2, 7, 31, 1919; for the text of this secret agreement, see Hurewitzed. , Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. II, p. 251.

59. J. Balfour, Recent Happenings in Persia. London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1922, p. 107; and N. S. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia; 1917-1923. New York: Russell F. Moore Company, 1952, p. 26.

60. For the Bolshevik documents outlining their policies toward Iran During the period under study, see J. Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951, Vol. I, pp. 28 ff.; J. R. Childs Perso-Russian Treaties and Notes of 1828-1931 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1936), pp. 64 ff.; X. Eudin and R. C. North, Soviet Russia and the East; 1917-1927. Standford: Standford University Press, 1957, pp. 92-93; and J. Bunyan and H. H. Fischer, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918 Documents and Materials. Standford University Press, 1934, pp. 467-69.

61. For reference, see Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, pp. 152-153.

62. For a Persian account, see M. Sepahr, Iran dar Jang-i Bozorg (Iran in the Great War) Tehran: Chapkhaneh-i Bank-i Melli, 1336/1957, pp. 70-88.

63. For example. see Carr, The Bolshevik revolution, Vol. III, P. 240-241.

64. See W. G. Rosenberg, A. I. Denikin and the Anti- Bolshevik Movement in South Russia. Amherst Amherst College Press, 1961.

65. L. C. Dunsterville, Military Mission to Northwest Persia, 1918, in Journal of Royal Central Asia Society, Vol., VIII, No. 2 (1922), pp. 80-85. and for a complete examination of this important question, consult G. Lenczowsky, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1941. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1949, p. 10.

66. VI Lenin, Inflammable Material in World Politics, in The National Liberation Movement, p 15.

67. For reference, see H. Kohn, A History of Nationalism in the East. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1929, pp128 ff.

68. R Luxembourg, The Accumulation of Capital: and N. Bukharin, Imperialism and the World Economy. New York: Howard Fertig, 1966.

69. In a nutshell, his theory runs as follows: capitalism, in order not to confront the inevitable communist revolution because of the development of internal contradictions, had found an escape valve by colonising the world in its search of cheap raw materials, a market for commodities and extra capital, and cheap labour to exploit. Through the stage of capitalism (imperialism) super profits were made from the colonies which enable the capitalists to bribe a part of the worker (labour aristocracy), thereby avoiding the coming revolutions in the West. Exploitation of the colonies and semi-colonies should be viewed on an international level. For even while certain sections of workers in the imperialist states were somewhat sharing the super profits reaped by the capitalist system, the colonised peoples and oppressed nations were being exploited in the same way as were the majority of the workers in the industrialised and capitalist world. Therefore, exploitation had also been internationalised, and imperialism was creating a favourable ground for the colonised and oppressed peoples and nations to rise against in the same way as capitalism had provided a condition under which the workers the capitalist world to rise against the bourgeoisie. As a result of this historical development, the peoples of Asia, as well as other continents, would inevitably wage national liberation wars against the capitalist states. For details, see VI Lenin, Imperialism the highest stage of capitalism.

70. VI Lenin, “The Junius pamphlet”, in The national Liberation Movement, p167.

71. V I Lenin, “Three Types of Countries in Relation to self-determination of Nations”, in Selected Works. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1936-1939 Vol. V, p. 276.

72. For further details, see Sephr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran. Berkeley; University of California, 1966, pp. 2-4.

73. For a detailed account of these divergent views on national and colonial questions presented in the Second Congress of the Communist International, see The Second Congress of the Communist International, Proceedings of the Petrograd session of 17 July and Moscow Sessions of 19 July to 7 August 1920 (America: 1921): Also see The Second Congress of the Communist International as Reported and Interpreted by the Official newspapers of Soviet Russia, Petrograd-Moscow 19 July-17 August 1920. Washington DC : Government printing office, 1920.

74. VI Lenin, "Preliminary Draft of Thesis on the national and Colonial Questions", in On Politics and Revolution, ed. James E. Conner. New York: Western Publishing Co. 1968, p. 319.

75. M. N. Roy, “Disagreement with Lenin over the Colonial Question”, Radical Humanist. Calcutta: January 22, 1954, p. 43. For a better understanding of Roy's views on nationalism and colonial questions, see Robert C. North and Xenia Eudin, “M. N. Roy and the Theory of Decolonisation”, Radical Humanist (July 12, 1959): also, see Robert C. North, “Revolution in Asia”, in L. Labedz, ed., Revisionism, Essays on the History of Marxist Ideas. New York: Praeger, 1962.

76. For a complete text of Sultanzadeh's speech in Persia, see Assnad-i Tarikhi (Historical Documents; Working Class, Social Democratic, and communist Movements in Iran), Berlin: Mazdak 1970 pp. 70-71

77. The most important of these amendments was the replacing of the phrase “bourgeois-democratic” by “national-revolutionary”. For details see Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East. New York: Praeger, 1959, p. 18.

78. Joseph Stalin, “Marxism and the National Questio”, In The Essential Stalin, ed. by B. Franklin. Garden City, N Y: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,1972, pp. 65-72.

79. V I Lenin, “Report of the commission on the national and Colonial Questions” Selected Works. Moscow: Cospoliterzdat, 1964 ,Vol. 3, p 500.

80. Ibid. ,PP. 500-1.

81. Lenczowski, Russia and the Western Iran, P. 10.

82. For the text of this appeal, see and Fischer, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918; Documents and Materials, pp. 467-69.

83. For the text of this invitation in English, see I. Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World. Seattle: University of Washington, 1959, pp. 21-23.

84. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran, P. 140.

85. Iran December 30, 1917.

86. Kaveh, Vol, III, No. 24 (February 15, 1918), pp. 1 and 4.

87. For reference, see J. Degras, The Communist International, 1919-1943. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956, Vol. L p. 106.

88. See Kapur, Soviet Russia and the Asia, P. 153; and Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East pp 92-93.

89. Sepahr, Iran in The Great War, pp 447-48 and North, Soviet Russia and the East, pp 92-93.

90. Curzon's effort to keep Persia under British and free of any trace of Bolshevik revolutionary ideas and influence, see Leshem, Soviet in the Middle East, Middle East Affairs Vol. IV, No. 1 (January, 1953), p 2.

91. Nicolson, Curzon: The last Phase, 1919-1925. London: Constable and Co 1934.

92. For the full text of this Agreement in English, see Hurewitz, ed. Diplomacy in the Middle East, Vol. II, pp 64-66.

93. See Nicolson, Curzon, The last Phase, pp 128-38.

94. L. P. Elwell-Sutton, “Nationalism and Neutralism in Iran”, In Middle East Journal, Vol. XII, No. 1 (1958).

95. L. Binder, Iran: Political Development in Changing Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962, p. 328.

96. For example, see Setareh, October 6, 1919: Aftab, November 6, 1916, Kaveh, Vol. IV. No. 38 (January 22, 1920), PP. 9-12, and Iran, August 15, 1919.

97. See Tajaddad, official organ of the Democratic party of Azerbaijan, Published during the 1917-1920 period in Tabriz, and Janqal, irregular organ of the Committee of Islam and the Jangali guerrillas, published during the 1917-1920 period in Rasht.

98. For reference, see M. N, Ivanova, “The National Liberation Movement in Gilan Province of Persia in 1920-1921”, English summary in The Central Asian Review, Vol. IV. No. 3 (1956).

99. For a detailed account of the split within the United Front see Anonymous, “Jonbesh-i Komonist-ye Iran” (Communist Movement in Iran) Tudeh, The theoretical organ of the revolutionary organisation of the Tudeh party outside of Iran, Vol. II, No. 15 (September, 1969).